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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
ALFRED P. KATOA, : Case No. 981699-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WITHOUT 
ADEQUATELY CONSIDERING STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTORS. 
The State asserts on appeal that the sentencing court did 
not abuse its discretion in consecutively imposing two zero-to-
five-year prison sentences on Appellant Alfred P. Katoa ("Katoa") 
because it gave due consideration to all the statutory factors 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998). See State's 
Brief ("S.B.") at Point I. The State also asserts lack of 
preservation regarding two points made by Katoa on appeal. Id. 
at 17,25-26. The State's arguments are without merit.1 
A. The State's Analysis is Too Narrow And Does Not 
Account For The Broad Range Of Information That A 
Sentencing Court Is Bound To Consider In Imposing 
Consecutive Or Concurrent Terms. 
As an initial matter, in defense of the sentencing court's 
decision to impose consecutive sentences upon Katoa, the State 
devotes much of its discussion to the indisputably tragic fact 
that five people died as a result of the accident caused by Katoa 
1
 Select arguments set forth by the State will be 
addressed herein. Katoa submits on his opening brief in response 
to other arguments presented by the State that are not expressly 
responded to on reply. 
and his co-defendant, Aisea Akauloa ("Akauloa"), then peppers the 
remainder of its brief with other allusions to this fact. See 
S.B. Point I.A,B.1,17,25. 
The State's emotional argument on appeal eclipses the legal 
issue before this Court in the present case, i.e., whether the 
sentencing court "may not have given adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 
(Utah 1998) . In addition to considering the "gravity of the 
circumstances," the sentencing court is bound also to consider 
"the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1998) (stating 
presumption for concurrent sentencing unless court determines 
consecutive sentencing appropriate under statutorily prescribed 
factors); see also Katoa's Opening Brief ("A.B.") at 5-20 
(discussing sentencing court's treatment of each statutory 
element). 
The State does not dispute that the sentencing court is 
required to consider all of the factors under section 76-3-
401(4). See S.B.9-10. Nonetheless, arguing that the sentencing 
court need not give "equal weight" to each of the factors, the 
State defends the sentencing order on the basis that it gave them 
due consideration. S.B.10 (citations omitted). However, the 
State's defense of the court's decision is exceedingly narrow and 
does not account for the broad range of information that is both 
appropriate and statutorily required for the court to consider. 
2 
For example, the State argues that the court did not abuse 
its discretion simply because "'all the mitigating information 
was before the trial court.'" S.B.9 (quoting A.B.9-10 n.2). The 
State's argument misleadingly suggests that Katoa himself 
concedes this point on appeal. In fact, Katoa contests this very 
proposition; a sentencing court is not presumed to have given due 
consideration to all the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(4) 
simply because all the mitigating information is before the it in 
one form or another, e.g. through the presentence report ("PSR") 
or the testimonies of victims and family members. See A.B. 9-
10,n.2 (offering discussion under case law). The State offers no 
case law in support of its stance, however, beyond the bare 
statement that a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion 
under section 76-3-401 where all the mitigating information is 
before it. See S.B.9. 
The State further argues that Katoa admitted in his plea 
agreement that he drove under the influence of alcohol and 
therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
consider the fact that Katoa's 0.02 blood alcohol level ("BAL") 
was well below the legal limit of .08, and that there was no 
quantifiable amount of marijuana metabolite in his system at the 
accident scene. See S.B.13-16. The State notes in particular 
that the offense of automobile homicide, to which Katoa pled, 
includes the element of operating a motor vehicle with a BAL of 
.08 or under the influence of any combination of alcohol and 
drugs "to a degree that renders the actor incapable of safely 
3 
operating the vehicle." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (a) 
(1995); S.B.15. The State similarly notes Katoa's statement in 
his plea admitting that he drove under the influence of alcohol. 
R.28; S.B.15. 
The category of information that a sentencing court is 
allowed to assess in determining the "gravity of the 
circumstances," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4), is not as narrowly 
constricted as the State suggests. The language of the 
concurrent sentencing statute itself suggests that a court is not 
tied to considering the elements of the offense, but rather the 
"gravity of the circumstances" surrounding the offense. Id. 
Indeed, the definition of "circumstance" includes any "fact 
accompanying another, either incidentally or as an essential 
condition or determining factor." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 259 
(2d College Ed. 1979). 
Moreover, case law holds that a sentencing court may look 
beyond the bare statutory elements of the offenses in assessing 
the circumstances of a case, even where a defendant pleas to the 
offenses for which he is being sentenced. In Galli, for example, 
the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated 
robbery. 967 P.2d at 932. The Utah Supreme Court reversed a 
consecutive sentencing order, in part, because the sentencing 
court did not consider the fact that the gun used by the 
defendant during the commission of the aggravated robberies was a 
pellet gun "incapable of inflicting serious injury." 967 P.2d at 
938. The type of gun used is not an element of aggravated 
4 
robbery, and has no bearing upon guilt for that offense.2 See 
also. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) (affirming 
consecutive sentencing order where sentencing court found 
defendant's crimes to be senseless and brutal, although 
senselessness and brutality were not elements of the offenses of 
criminal homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended); 
attempted criminal homicide, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202, 76-4-101 
(1953 as amended); aggravated arson, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103; 
aggravated kidnaping, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953 as 
amended); aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-3 02 (1953 as 
amended); theft, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 04 (1953 as amended); or 
aggravated assault Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953 as amended)). 
Accordingly, the State's assertion that the sentencing court 
did not abuse its discretion in failing to acknowledge Katoa's 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1998) provides: "(1) A 
person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear; or (b) the person 
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft. (2) An act 
shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) provides: "(1) A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in section 76-1-601; [or] causes serious bodily injury 
upon another." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) defines "dangerous 
weapon" as "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury; or a facsimile or representation of the item; and: (i) 
the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonable believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an 
item." 
5 
BAL that was well within the legal limit, and the fact that there 
was non-quantifiable result of marijuana metabolite in his 
bloodstream, is not a correct statement of the law regarding the 
appropriate range of information that a sentencing court may-
consider in assessing the "gravity of the circumstances." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Rather, the court should have, but 
erroneously failed to, consider these important mitigating facts 
which are appropriate considerations notwithstanding the 
technical definition of the elements of the crime of automobile 
homicide. See A.B. at 12-14 (discussing court's inadequate 
consideration of the facts in mitigation of the circumstances in 
this case). 
The State likewise challenges Katoa's argument that his 
crimes were not committed with malice. See S.B.12. The State 
misconstrues Katoa's argument, asserting that it "assume[s] the 
legal proposition that the sentencing court abuses its discretion 
if it imposes consecutive prison terms for crimes that are not 
committed intentionally or maliciously." Id. 
The State mischaracterizes Katoa's argument however. Katoa 
never made such an assertion but rather argued only that the lack 
of malice goes to the "gravity of the circumstances." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see A.B.12-13. Moreover, Katoa cites to 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 932, 938; State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1301-02 (Utah 1993); and State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244-45 
(Utah 1995), to demonstrate that the "incongruity of the 
consecutive sentencing order . . . [in light of] other cases, 
6 
wherein similar orders were vacated [although the defendant's 
were convicted of] intentional crimes." A.B.12. Accordingly, 
contrary to the State's misguided argument on appeal, 
consideration of lack of malice is an appropriate mitigating 
consideration that should have been, but was not, made by the 
court below. Id. 
The State's argument on appeal similarly begs the real issue 
in this case, i.e. whether the sentencing court gave "adequate 
consideration" to all the factors set forth in section 76-3-401, 
to the extent that it contends that "[t]he imposition of 
consecutive prison terms is not unprecedented in Utah" or other 
jurisdictions, citing State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Whitley, 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1964); and State v. 
Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986)). S.B.13. 
Katoa does not contest that consecutive sentences may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances so long as the sentencing 
court gives due consideration to the factors set forth in section 
76-3-401(4). However, none of the cases cited by the State offer 
any analysis of the propriety of the consecutive sentences under 
section 76-3-401 or similar statutes in Missouri or Alaska. 
Instead, they stand for the singular proposition that "'a single 
criminal act or episode may constitute as many offenses as there 
are victims'" without violating Double Jeopardy. Gambrell. 814 
P.2d at 1140 (quotation omitted); see also Whitley, 382 S.W.2d at 
667; Dunlop, 721 P.2d at 609-10. Accordingly, the cases cited by 
the State offer no guidance as to whether the sentencing court in 
7 
this case gave "adequate weight" to the specific circumstances of 
Katoa's case. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
With regard to the sentencing court's duty to adequately 
consider Katoa's "rehabilitative needs," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(4), the State asserts that the court did not abuse its 
discretion because the sentence does not "rob the Board of 
Pardons [("Board")] of its discretion to adjust the actual time 
defendant serves in prison." S.B.24. 
The State's analysis, however, does not address all aspects 
of the rationale underlying the requirement that a court consider 
the rehabilitative needs of a defendant. The Galli decision 
indicates that rehabilitative needs merit consideration 
independent of considerations going to the Board's flexibility. 
In that case, the Supreme Court looked first to the fact that the 
defendant exhibited positive characteristics indicating that he 
was a good candidate for rehabilitation. 967 P.2d at 93 8. 
Indeed, the defendant's rehabilitative needs took precedence over 
the consideration of the Board's flexibility in determining the 
length of the sentence. Id. 
The primary concern given to a defendant's rehabilitative 
needs indicated in Galli reflects the realities of sentencing and 
therefore constitutes better policy. A sentencing court's 
determination to impose consecutive sentences carries weight with 
the Board and is likely to influence the Board's decision to keep 
an inmate incarcerated for a longer period of time. Conversely, 
a court's imposition of concurrent sentences is likely to 
8 
persuade the Board to release an inmate earlier than it might 
have otherwise. Therefore, as a matter of policy, it is 
important that a defendant enter into the prison system with the 
appropriate sentence because it impacts his case in the eyes of 
the Board of Pardons. Hence, the State's emphasis on the Board's 
flexibility in this case is misplaced under Galli, 967 P.2d at 
938. 
B. The Sentencing Court Abused It's Discretion In 
Basing It's Decision On An Erroneous Factual Finding. 
i. The Issue Is Properly Before This Court. 
The State contends that Katoa did not preserve his challenge 
to the sentencing court's false and, therefore, legally erroneous 
factual finding that he "had been arrested, convicted and 
sentenced for drinking crimes." R.76[24]; see S.B.17-18. The 
State argues in particular that Katoa never "apprisfed] the 
sentencing court of the inaccuracy or otherwise rais[ed] the 
issue either at the time the sentencing court made the 
misstatement or in his Motion to Correct Sentence." S.B.17-18. 
The State's preservation argument is without merit. To 
"preserve [] [an] issue for appeal, [a party] must have raised the 
claim such that the sentencing court had 'an opportunity to rule 
on the issue' and make an adequate record for appellate review." 
State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992)). Where a sentencing 
court has had an opportunity to address a claim of error, "the 
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened 
considerably." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 
9 
1991) . 
The Utah Supreme Court in Smith, 909 P.2d at 244, held that 
"it is appropriate for a reviewing court to construe an objection 
to embrace issues reasonably included within the scope of the 
objection." Accordingly, a reviewing court looks to the overall 
context of a case and precludes review only where the arguments 
presented below bear no cognizable or reasonable relation to the 
issues presented on appeal. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 
874 (Utah 1993) (defendant did not waive appeal where grounds for 
objection were apparent from context); see also State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1989) (sentencing objection 
that evidence lacked foundation was not appealable on prejudice 
grounds); State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 155 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) 
(declining review based on alleged violation of confrontation 
right where objection at trial was based on relevance); State v. 
Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App. 1992) (declining review 
under Rule 4 04 where defendant objected at trial on grounds of 
improper form, assuming facts, irrelevance, and Rule 403 
exclusion); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App. 1990) 
(appeal precluded where defendant objected to evidence as leading 
at trial, not as inadmissible under Rule 608 and State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)). 
Under the foregoing principles of preservation, Katoa's 
challenge to the false finding is properly before this Court. 
First, Katoa's initial request for concurrent sentencing at the 
July 20, 1998, sentencing hearing necessarily assumes an 
10 
objection to the court's final order for consecutive sentences 
and all of the court's findings in support thereof. This is 
especially true where, as here, Katoa did not stipulate to any of 
the findings made by the court either below or on appeal. 
Compare State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 359 n.5 (Utah App. 1996) 
(defendant conceded that "the gravity of the circumstances . . . 
weigh against concurrent sentences" and that the "trial court for 
the most part acted within proper bounds in assessing Montoya's 
history and character"). Moreover, in this context, it runs 
counter to the efficient administration of justice to require a 
party to articulate an objection to each and every finding in 
support of such a final order on the record when the nature of 
the hearing itself implies an objection to consecutive sentencing 
on any ground the court might find. 
In addition, contrary to the State's assertion, Katoa's 
challenge to the false factual finding is likewise implicit in 
his written motion to correct the sentence filed on July 28, 
1998. See R.51-53. In that motion, Katoa explicitly argued that 
the consecutive sentences were not legal in part because his 
"prior record included only [] misdemeanors." R.52. The 
misdemeanors that Katoa referred to were set forth in the PSR and 
included one misdemeanor conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, plus various convictions for battery, 
assault, obstruction, resisting arrest, and vandalism. R.75[9-
10] . His misdemeanor record did not include any convictions for 
"drinking crimes" as the sentencing court found at the sentencing 
11 
hearing. R.76[24]. Given that the PSR was available at all 
times to the sentencing court for review, Katoa's objection to 
the false factual finding regarding his non-existent "drinking 
crimes" is sufficiently apparent from his written motion to 
correct sentence, the PSR, and the overall context of these 
proceedings, as well as clear from the record itself. 
That the erroneous factual finding issue is adequately 
preserved in this case is underscored by the fact that, in the 
specific context of sentencing issues decided pursuant to section 
76-3-401, a sentencing court is presumed to be aware of all the 
mitigating information before it in the form of the PSR, 
arguments made by the defendant, and letters or testimony from 
victims, family members, counselors.3 See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 
(reversing consecutive sentencing order where court did not give 
"adequate weight" to information before it); see also A.B.9-10 
n.2 (discussing case law indicating that sentencing courts are 
presumed to be aware of all mitigating information in a case). 
It follows, therefore, that the sentencing court had an adequate 
opportunity to correct its error when Katoa challenged the 
consecutive sentences on the basis that his record "included only 
prior misdemeanors," R.52, and not the "drinking crimes" that the 
sentencing court erroneously referred to in its findings. 
R.76 [24] . 
3
 As noted in footnote 2 of Katoa's opening brief, however, 
a sentencing court's awareness of mitigating information does not 
necessarily assume it's adequate consideration of that 
information. See A.B.9-10 n.2. 
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Even assuming for the sake of argument only that Katoa had 
not adequately preserved this issue for appeal, this Court could 
still review the claim for manifest injustice. See State v. 
Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). "When reviewing a 
claim of manifest injustice, [reviewing courts] generally use the 
same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error 
exists under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence [(1998)]." 
Id. (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989)). 
"That standard is two-pronged. 'First, the error must be 
'obvious.' Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude 
that it affects the substantial rights of a party.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)). 
In the present case, the error is "obvious." Rudolph, 970 
P.2d at 1226. The sentencing court found that Katoa had a 
history of "drinking crimes," but the PSR clearly indicates, in a 
section titled "Adult Record," that Katoa has no prior conviction 
for any alcohol offenses. R.75[9-10]. As noted above, the 
sentencing court was aware of the PSR since it was part of the 
record. R.75. In fact, the sentencing court made statements 
during the sentencing hearing indicating that it had read the PSR 
and noted Katoa's criminal history. For example, the court 
stated at one point that "Mr. Akauloa's record is significantly 
worse than Mr. Katoa's. Mr. Akauloa had a very similar incident 
within just a couple of years of this incident. He also had a 
much higher blood alcohol level than Mr. Katoa." R.76[ll]. The 
court could not have commented on these mitigating aspects of the 
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case if it had not read through the PSR, notably the section 
regarding Katoa's criminal history. Accordingly, the court's 
false factual finding is "obvious" for purposes of review for 
manifest injustice. Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1226. 
In addition, "the error [is] of sufficient magnitude that it 
affects [Katoa's] substantial rights." Id. It is axiomatic that 
procedural due process requires that sentencing determinations be 
based upon truthful and accurate factual information. See U.S. 
Const, amend. V, XIV; Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1102 (Utah 
1994); State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986). "Beyond the issue of 
accuracy, there is also a concern for legitimacy that has always 
animated due process doctrine in the criminal law. Justice 
Marshall [of the U.S. Supreme Court stated,] '[T]his Court has 
stressed the importance of adopting procedures that preserve the 
appearance of fairness and the confidence of inmates in the 
decisionmaking process.'" Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 
870 P.2d 902, 910 (Utah 1993) (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 34, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1979)). 
In the present case, Katoa is being held on consecutive 
prison terms based on a false factual finding that he had a 
history of "drinking crimes." R.76[24]. Not only does this 
amount to a violation of his right to procedural due process 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, but it undermines the legitimacy of his sentence. 
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Accordingly, the error in this case affects Katoa's "substantial 
rights" and is of "sufficient magnitude" to merit review of this 
issue for manifest injustice. Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1226. 
ii• The Erroneous Factual Finding Merits Reversal. 
The State contends that the "challenged statement, when 
viewed in light of the court's entire remarks at sentencing, was 
simply an observation that both defendants had committed 
substance abuse crimes" and was "harmless at worst" given 
additional information before the court regarding Katoa's 
criminal past. S.B.18-19. 
The State's argument is disingenuous; the factual finding is 
not a mere "observation that both defendants had committed 
substance abuse crimes . . . [with] no particular emphasis [] 
placed on either type of offense." S.B.18. First, factual 
findings are the empirical basis of a court's legal decision, in 
this case, the legal decision to impose consecutive sentencing. 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (facts 
constitute the "empirical" basis of a legal decision). Moreover, 
this particular factual finding is not a vague or ambiguous 
comment upon Katoa's general use of controlled substances as the 
State suggests. Rather, the court made an unambiguous and 
explicit finding that "both [Katoa and Akauloa] had been 
arrested, convicted and sentenced for drinking crimes and drug 
crimes." R.76[24]. 
The State further dismisses the court's false finding as 
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"harmless" because "the PSI included other evidence, unchallenged 
by defendant, that supported the court's concern regarding 
defendant's past substance abuse" and his prior alcohol use. 
S.B.19. However, this fact is immaterial to the issue concerning 
the false finding that Katoa had a history of drinking crimes. 
The issue in this matter does not concern whether Katoa had prior 
convictions for substance abuse. In fact, to the extent that 
substance abuse refers to drug use,4 Katoa acknowledged that he 
had a prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance dating back to 1995 when he lived in California. See 
A.B.7 n.l. Moreover, this issue does not concern Katoa's use of 
alcohol in the past. He admitted that as well in the PSR. 
R.75[14] . The issue concerns only whether Katoa was convicted of 
an alcohol related offense. The PSR indicates clearly that he 
was not, R.75[9-10], and therefore the sentencing court's false 
finding cannot be justified based on the arguments set forth by 
the State on appeal. 
C. Katoa's Argument Under Article I, Section 9 Of The 
Utah Constitution Is Properly Raised On Appeal. 
The State argues that Katoa's claim that the consecutive 
prison terms violated his rights under the undue rigor clause of 
Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution is without merit 
because it was not preserved below, was vaguely discussed on 
4
 Section 58-37-2 (1) (e) (ii) (1995), defining controlled 
substances, provides: "Controlled substance does not include: (A) 
distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are 
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food." 
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appeal, and, in any event, the unnecessary rigor clause does not 
apply to "'terms of punishment. '" S.B.25-26 (citing State v. 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654 (Utah App. 1997)). 
As an initial matter, Katoa does not request this Court to 
render a decision in terms of Article I, Section 9. Rather, 
Katoa seeks redress under the more general argument that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences where mitigating factors supported concurrent 
sentencing. See A.B.5 (entitling sole issue on appeal as, "The 
Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Sentencing Katoa To 
Consecutive Sentences"). 
Moreover, Katoa mentioned Article I, Section 9 in order to 
highlight to the Court the underlying concerns in this case, 
namely that Katoa's sentence was unfair in light of numerous 
mitigating factors indicating the propriety of concurrent terms, 
and in light of the fact that his codefendant received the same 
sentence although, by the sentencing court's own admission, 
Akauloa bore more culpability in the matter than Katoa. See 
Point D infra. 
Additionally, contrary to the State's assertion, Article I, 
Section 9 concerns are implicated in this matter. The State 
cites non-binding dicta from Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654, for the 
proposition that Article I, Section 9 is not implicated by a 
sentencing court's erroneous decision to impose consecutive 
sentencing. S.B.26. However, the Utah Supreme Court case of 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1993) indicates that 
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Article I, Section 9 is, in fact, implicated in this context to 
the extent that it addressed the defendant's claim under the 
unnecessary rigor clause. Accordingly, while Katoa is not asking 
that this issue be analyzed under Article I, Section 9, there are 
Article I, Section 9 concerns underlying Katoa's issue on appeal. 
D. The State's Analysis Does Not Address The 
Incongruity In Sentencing Katoa To The Same Sentence As 
Akauloa Where The Sentencing Court Itself Acknowledged 
Akauloa's Greater Culpability And More Serious Criminal 
History. 
As a final matter, the State's brief does not address the 
incongruity in sentencing Katoa and Akauloa to the same 
consecutive terms where the court itself acknowledged that 
Akauloa had a "significantly worse" criminal history, including a 
prior auto accident mirroring this one, R.76[ll,24], and a 
greater degree of culpability in this particular matter, namely a 
"much higher" BAL that exceeded the legal limit. R.76[ll]. 
Indeed, the sentencing court stated that it saw Katoa in a 
"different light." Id. 
The incongruity in sentencing in this case underscores the 
court's abuse of discretion because it demonstrates exactly how 
the court failed to give any weight at all to the mitigating 
information in Katoa's case. Point for point, Katoa's case was 
less egregious and more deserving of concurrent sentencing than 
Akauloa's case. Katoa had a BAL of .02 and therefore was not 
legally drunk. R.75[3] ;76 [4] . Akauloa, by contrast, had a BAL 
of .11, which exceeded the legal limit of .08. R.5. Katoa had a 
relatively minor criminal history that ended in 1995, with no 
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convictions in Utah, no juvenile record, no convictions for 
reckless driving, and no charges pending at the time of 
sentencing. R.76 [9-10,21-22] . Katoa, however, as the court 
acknowledged twice during sentencing, had a "record [that] shows 
much more serious criminal activity in the past and also this 
other incident where you were lucky you didn't kill anybody, just 
a couple of years before this one." R.76[23]; see also R.76[ll]. 
The court summed it up best when it stated, " [i]t is clear that, 
particularly Mr. Katoa, is not as evil as some people I see here 
in court.» R.76[23]. 
The court additionally commended Katoa!s responsibility and 
cooperation in this case, recognizing the fact that he cooperated 
with police in their investigation, accepted responsibility for 
his crime, and expressed "sincere remorse" to the victims1 
families. R.76[23]. On account of these facts, the court said, 
"I am going to give you credit for that." Id. 
Yet, despite its own awareness of Katoa's lesser 
culpability, and its recognition of Katoa's remorse and 
responsible behavior after the accident, the court ordered the 
same consecutive sentence that it imposed upon Akauloa. 
R.76 [24]. Hence, contrary to its statement on the record, the 
court did not give Katoa any "credit" for the mitigating aspects 
of his case. R.76[23]. In short, the court's order underscores 
how it failed to give "adequate weight" to legitimate mitigating 
factors in this case. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Accordingly, the 
consecutive sentencing order goes against the clear weight of the 
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evidence and thus constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion. 
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and the arguments set forth in his 
opening brief, Katoa respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the lower court's consecutive sentencing order and remand for 
concurrent sentencing. 
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